cvrf2cusa/cvrf/2021/cvrf-openEuler-SA-2021-1161.xml
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cvrfdoc xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1" xmlns:cvrf="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1">
<DocumentTitle xml:lang="en">An update for netty is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1</DocumentTitle>
<DocumentType>Security Advisory</DocumentType>
<DocumentPublisher Type="Vendor">
<ContactDetails>openeuler-security@openeuler.org</ContactDetails>
<IssuingAuthority>openEuler security committee</IssuingAuthority>
</DocumentPublisher>
<DocumentTracking>
<Identification>
<ID>openEuler-SA-2021-1161</ID>
</Identification>
<Status>Final</Status>
<Version>1.0</Version>
<RevisionHistory>
<Revision>
<Number>1.0</Number>
<Date>2021-05-06</Date>
<Description>Initial</Description>
</Revision>
</RevisionHistory>
<InitialReleaseDate>2021-05-06</InitialReleaseDate>
<CurrentReleaseDate>2021-05-06</CurrentReleaseDate>
<Generator>
<Engine>openEuler SA Tool V1.0</Engine>
<Date>2021-05-06</Date>
</Generator>
</DocumentTracking>
<DocumentNotes>
<Note Title="Synopsis" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">netty security update</Note>
<Note Title="Summary" Type="General" Ordinal="2" xml:lang="en">An update for netty is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1.</Note>
<Note Title="Description" Type="General" Ordinal="3" xml:lang="en">Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers &amp; clients. %package help Summary: Documents for %{name} Buildarch: noarch Requires: man info Provides: %{name}-javadoc = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: %{name}-javadoc &lt; %{version}-%{release} %description help Man pages and other related documents for %{name}.
Security Fix(es):
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers &amp; clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel&apos;s pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is True: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.(CVE-2021-21295)
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers &amp; clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to True. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.(CVE-2021-21409)</Note>
<Note Title="Topic" Type="General" Ordinal="4" xml:lang="en">An update for netty is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1.
openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of medium. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section.</Note>
<Note Title="Severity" Type="General" Ordinal="5" xml:lang="en">Medium</Note>
<Note Title="Affected Component" Type="General" Ordinal="6" xml:lang="en">netty</Note>
</DocumentNotes>
<DocumentReferences>
<Reference Type="Self">
<URL>https://openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2021-1161</URL>
</Reference>
<Reference Type="openEuler CVE">
<URL>https://openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail.html?id=CVE-2021-21295</URL>
<URL>https://openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail.html?id=CVE-2021-21409</URL>
</Reference>
<Reference Type="Other">
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21295</URL>
<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21409</URL>
</Reference>
</DocumentReferences>
<ProductTree xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/prod/1.1">
<Branch Type="Product Name" Name="openEuler">
<FullProductName ProductID="openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1">openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1</FullProductName>
</Branch>
<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="aarch64">
<FullProductName ProductID="netty-4.1.13-11" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1">netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
</Branch>
<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="noarch">
<FullProductName ProductID="netty-help-4.1.13-11" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1">netty-help-4.1.13-11.oe1.noarch.rpm</FullProductName>
</Branch>
<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="src">
<FullProductName ProductID="netty-4.1.13-11" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1">netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.src.rpm</FullProductName>
</Branch>
<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="x86_64">
<FullProductName ProductID="netty-4.1.13-11" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1">netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
</Branch>
</ProductTree>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="1" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers &amp; clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel&apos;s pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is True: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2021-05-06</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2021-21295</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.9</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>netty security update</Description>
<DATE>2021-05-06</DATE>
<URL>https://openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2021-1161</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
<Vulnerability Ordinal="2" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
<Notes>
<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="2" xml:lang="en">Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers &amp; clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to True. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.</Note>
</Notes>
<ReleaseDate>2021-05-06</ReleaseDate>
<CVE>CVE-2021-21409</CVE>
<ProductStatuses>
<Status Type="Fixed">
<ProductID>openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1</ProductID>
</Status>
</ProductStatuses>
<Threats>
<Threat Type="Impact">
<Description>Medium</Description>
</Threat>
</Threats>
<CVSSScoreSets>
<ScoreSet>
<BaseScore>5.9</BaseScore>
<Vector>AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N</Vector>
</ScoreSet>
</CVSSScoreSets>
<Remediations>
<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
<Description>netty security update</Description>
<DATE>2021-05-06</DATE>
<URL>https://openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2021-1161</URL>
</Remediation>
</Remediations>
</Vulnerability>
</cvrfdoc>